Shortages of vaccines for epidemic diseases, such as cholera, meningitis, and yellow fever, have become common over the past decade, hampering eff orts to control outbreaks through mass reactive vaccination campaigns. Additionally, various epidemiological, political, and logistical challenges, which are poorly documented in the literature, often lead to delays in reactive campaigns, ultimately reducing the eff ect of vaccination. In June 2015, a cholera outbreak occurred in Juba, South Sudan, and because of the global shortage of oral cholera vaccine, authorities were unable to secure suffi cient doses to vaccinate the entire at-risk population-approximately 1 million people. In this Personal View, we document the fi rst public health use of a reduced, single-dose regimen of oral cholera vaccine, and show the details of the decision-making process and timeline. We also make recommendations to help improve reactive vaccination campaigns against cholera, and discuss the importance of new and fl exible context-specifi c dose regimens and vaccination strategies.
Vaccine stockpile and supply limitations
Recent large, protracted cholera epidemics in the Caribbean and Africa (such as those in 2008, 2010, and 2012) highlight the limitations of classic outbreak response strategies that, in addition to case management, focus mainly on the promotion of handwashing, improved sanitation, and use of safe water. [1] [2] [3] Oral cholera vaccines have emerged as an eff ective new tool, bringing hope for improved cholera prevention and control both in endemic and epidemic settings. Three oral cholera vaccines are prequalifi ed by WHO: Dukoral (Valneva, Lyon, France), Shanchol (Shantha Biotechnics Ltd, Hyderabad, India), and Euvichol (Eubiologics, Gangwon-do, South Korea). All three are licensed as a two-dose regimen and are safe and eff ective. [4] [5] [6] Although oral cholera vaccines have also proven feasible and eff ective as an outbreak control measure, [7] [8] [9] wider reactive use is hindered by a series of obstacles: delays in identifying and confi rming initial cases and declaring outbreaks, the rapid and dynamic evolution of outbreaks, a recommended two-dose vaccine regimen, and above all, the global shortage of oral cholera vaccines.
In 2013, a global stockpile of oral cholera vaccines, initially of 2 million doses per year, was created to ensure vaccine availability for outbreak control. 10 Shanchol was the vaccine chosen for the stockpile because it was lower in price, it was easier to administer, and had potentially larger manufacturing capacity. The GAVI Alliance later committed to fund up to 70 million doses from 2014 to 2018, to expand outbreak and other emergency vaccination campaigns, and dedicated the remaining doses to cholera control in endemic countries. However, production and supply of Shanchol is behind schedule: only 4 million doses of the vaccine were available for purchase in 2014-15. Because of this shortage nearly all of the vaccine produced immediately goes to the emergency stockpile, which is the only way to access Shanchol, including for outbreak control in endemic countries. Furthermore, to align with the scale of global vaccine availability, requests for oral cholera vaccines have been substantially smaller than the true demand, hindering eff orts to forecast future demand. Fortunately, additional doses of the newly prequalifi ed Euvichol have become available this year, helping to alleviate some of this shortfall.
The stockpile is managed by the International Coordination Group under the WHO secretariat, comprised of representatives from Médecins Sans Frontières, International Federation of the Red Cross, UNICEF, and WHO. Countries or agencies wishing to use oral cholera vaccines in response to outbreaks must submit a request to the International Coordination Group including information about laboratory confi rmation of cholera cases, a risk assessment of the probability of epidemic expansion, an overview of the country's capacity to control the outbreak, a detailed vaccination plan with a map of targeted areas, a plan to cover the operational costs of vaccination, and an outline of the monitoring and evaluation activities used to learn from each deployment. 11 This process, meant to direct scarce supplies of vaccine to where they could have most eff ect, in practice presents substantial hurdles to rapid use of oral cholera vaccines in emergencies, especially in rapidly evolving epidemics.
The 2015 cholera epidemic in Juba, South Sudan
These obstacles were highlighted in June 2015, when cholera broke out in Juba, the capital of South Sudan (fi gure 1). Juba is a city estimated to have between 500 000 and 1 million inhabitants, with massive population movements both into and out of the city because of civil strife that started in December 2013.
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The cholera outbreak spread rapidly in several disjointed neighbourhoods of Juba, with over 100 suspected cases reported at health facilities within a month of the fi rst culture-confi rmed case. Historical data from South Sudan, 12 including those from the 2014 outbreak, suggested that Juba could serve as a hub of transmission to the whole country, which has experienced epidemics lasting as long as 8 months. To rapidly curb the 2015 epidemic, decrease mortality, and reduce the chance of spread to other parts of the country-particularly those in the middle of civil warthe National Cholera Task Force proposed use of oral cholera vaccines alongside improvements in case management, access to safe water, and sanitation and hygiene promotion.
Preparations for the International Coordination Group request began the week the outbreak was declared (fi gure 1). With fewer than 900 000 doses in the oral cholera vaccine stockpile and rough population estimates of up to 1 million people in Juba alone, the decision of how to best use the limited vaccine available was complex. The evidence available suggested that the fi rst dose of Shanchol is highly immunogenic, and that on its own it probably provides some clinical protection (33-67% for estimates for the period 6-22 months after vaccination), although at a lower level than the full two-dose regimen (40-87% for estimates for the period 6-24 months after vaccination). 5, 7, 9, [13] [14] [15] [16] However, providing just one dose per person would allow double the number of people to be vaccinated, and could potentially increase population-wide protection (herd immunity), thereby having a greater eff ect on public health. 17 On the basis of this information, alongside promising initial results from a large single-dose clinical trial 15 presented in a scientifi c meeting at the time of the outbreak, the decision was taken to target a larger atrisk population with a single dose of oral cholera vaccine (Shanchol). After wider consultations with key stakeholders, the Ministry of Health, supported by Médecins Sans Frontières, requested 640 000 doses to cover Juba and Torit counties. Torit county had no reported cases at the time, but is thought of as an area with substantial history of cholera prevalence and typically high case-fatality ratios. 18, 19 The request was submitted 14 days after the epidemic was fi rst declared (fi gure 1). The International Coordination Group reviewed the request within days, but approved only 270 340 doses for a two-dose schedule in Torit, because they judged the epidemic in Juba too mature for use of oral cholera vaccines. However, since the number of new cases did not decrease in Juba and no cases had been reported in Torit, another round of discussions reassessed how to best use the number of doses approved, which was insuffi cient to cover the whole of Juba city, even with a single-dose strategy. The fact that only selected areas within a large urban population would receive the vaccine, while other areas would not, led to fears of civil unrest due to high demand for the vaccine in non-targeted areas. The Ministry of Health maintained the focus on Juba to maximise the eff ect on public health by targeting areas of the city with sustained or increasing disease transmission (on the basis of Ministry of Health situation reports 12 and analyses of the line list data), and high-risk groups (eg, prisoners, internally displaced people, and health-care workers). It took 3 weeks from the International Coordination Group decision to the time when all stakeholders, from national to local levels, supported a revised, targeted, single-dose vaccination campaignthe point at which the fi rst people could be vaccinated (fi gure 1).
The oral cholera vaccines campaign
The targeted areas were defi ned conservatively because of concern about running out of vaccines (fi gure 2). Social mobilisation was also deliberately limited to avoid people from non-targeted areas coming to vaccination sites. Ultimately, 140 249 doses were administered in targeted areas of Juba during 6 days of a mass vaccination campaign, and by mobile teams targeting the high-risk groups in subsequent days. The vaccine was primarily delivered through fi xed vaccination posts (red dots, fi gure 2) and temporary mobile vaccination sites that were active for 1-2 days each after the number of individuals coming to the fi xed posts declined (green dots, fi gure 2). The feared civil unrest or massive demand for the vaccine did not materialise. The remaining doses were used as part of a comprehensive targeted intervention with water and 
Lessons learned
This experience highlights many of the diffi culties in planning eff ective and timely reactive oral cholera vaccine campaigns. It took over a month to cultureconfi rm the initial cases and declare the outbreak, the fi rst requirement before a request for vaccines can be submitted (fi gure 1). For a timely response to epidemics, countries should improve laboratory and surveillance capacity, and rapidly declare cholera outbreaks. The complex process of gathering and analysing data, to decide on whether oral cholera vaccines would be eff ective and to complete the vaccine request to the International Coordination Group, was further complicated in this case by consultations with all stakeholders because of the use of an alternative vaccination strategy. This experience illustrates the need for guidance on how and when to use oral cholera vaccines reactively, and for simplifying the mechanisms to access oral cholera vaccines from the stockpile to allow for timely use of vaccine in response to outbreaks, particularly in the most vulnerable settings with weak data collection systems.
Clear data-driven guidance on when and where a vaccine should be used reactively is available for other stockpiled vaccines, such as meningitis, 20 but it does not currently exist for oral cholera vaccine (panel). By reviewing historical outbreak dynamics and response timelines, WHO and the Global Taskforce for Cholera Control should consider creating clear recommendations for the reactive use of oral cholera vaccines. With this guidance, countries can update their cholera response plans to include a framework for use of reactive vaccination, which can reduce the time needed to make decisions within each country during epidemics.
Simplifi cations to the International Coordination Group application and process could also reduce delays in reactive oral cholera vaccine campaigns. This application requires that countries submit detailed plans about how the vaccine will be distributed. Although this is crucial for a successful campaign, these details are often made just before vaccination to adapt to the changing epi demiological situation. Eliminating these require ments and providing more autonomy to the Ministries of Health to make rational, context-tailored decisions, can reduce unnecessary delays. In high-risk settings experiencing frequent cholera epidemics, such as South Sudan, the International Coordination Group could include a mechanism for conditional pre-approval of oral cholera 
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vaccines (evaluating details of the context, risk factors, local capacity for response, and cold chain), thereby allowing countries to make a rapid request via a shortened skeleton request form if or when an outbreak is confi rmed. As global vaccine supply constraints ease, high-risk countries (or regions) could also consider stockpiling their own vaccine for rapid use.
The shortage of vaccines also means that the International Coordination Group must prioritise among competing demands. At the time of South Sudan's request to the International Coordination Group, an epidemic was raging among Burundian refugees in Tanzania, 21 large cholera endemic areas in Nepal were at increased risk because of displacement following the earthquake, 22 and Haiti had a resurgence of cholera in several locations. There are no clear criteria to guide International Coordination Group members on how to make allocation decisions with competing emergencies. Such criteria are urgently needed, to allow for realistic planning and to avoid delays that can compromise the timely and eff ective response to epidemics.
It is essential to address the shortage of vaccines, which is at the core of these problems and represents the greatest threat to their eff ective use. The manufacturer of Shanchol must keep its commitments to the global health community and make faster progress in increasing production, and other emerging manufacturers should be supported to hasten WHO prequalifi cation. Fortunately, since this epidemic, a new manufacturer of prequalifi ed oral cholera vaccines has met some of the demand, although we continue to face supply limitations, as illustrated by the 2016 oral cholera vaccine deployment to Haiti in response to Hurricane Matthew. 23 Flexible alternative vaccination strategies are needed, including highly targeted vaccination campaigns and single-dose regimens, to help to cope with global vaccine supply limitations and in challenging humanitarian contexts, including those with highly mobile populations. Clinical trial results from Bangladesh that show the effi cacy of single-dose oral cholera vaccine at an individual level, 12 together with the experiences from South Sudan, 24 should help to accelerate decision-making. Although more evidence is needed on the eff ectiveness and impact of alternative strategies, WHO and manu facturers should make clear recommendations about how to move forward with offlabel uses of the vaccine when supply shortages or logistical constraints make the standard strategies impossible.
As illustrated in South Sudan, use of oral cholera vaccine, in response to an outbreak can be complex, with delays caused by multiple factors. By critically revisiting reactive vaccination experiences, we can better understand the delays and adapt to improve future responses. By focusing on improved diagnostic capacity and planning at the country level, providing a clear framework for reactive vaccination decision making, simplifying the processes for gaining access to the global stockpile, and ensuring adequate production of oral cholera vaccines, future campaigns could avert more cases and save more lives.
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